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AMBIGUITY OF UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTES

THE AMBIGUITY OF UNAMBIGUOUS STATUTES
By CHARLES B. NUTTING*
a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no
VVroom for construction. However, in construing a statute,
intention governs the letter of the law and the literal meaning
of statutory language must give way to the purpose of the enactment. Statutes will not be construed to lead to absurd results if
avoidable. But the rule that statutes must be given a reasonable
"THERE

interpretation applies only where there is room or necessity for

interpretation and a hard and unjust application of a statute
does not authorize the court to change its plain provisions."
Reason appears not only to totter but permanently to vacate
her throne when these sentences are read. The horrendous effect
is obtained, however, merely by a horizontal rather than a vertical arrangement of the passages. They represent selected headnotes from the Fourth Decennial Digest. The textual treatment of
the same matters to be found in legal encyclopedias is less apparently absurd only because a greater space separates the statements.
In no field of the law is language used with a more wild disregard
of consequences than in statutory interpretation; nowhere is
precision of greater importance. This chaos is doubtless due in
part to a general lack of the type of critical analysis which has
been devoted to other subjects. Pending the arrival of a Williston or Wigmore of legislation, it behooves lesser lights to attempt,
however inadequately, to shovel out portions of the Augean
stables. Though statutory interpretation be largely an art rather
than a science, and hence incapable of reduction to definite formulae, much good should result from a general recognition of
problems and definition of principles. Even this may prove to
be impossible. If it is, a frank recognition of the fact is better
than continued resort to empty phrases such as those quoted
above under the delusion that they stand for something in the
world of reality.
What is ambiguity? Resort to Webster produces the following: "Ambiguousness in meaning arising from language admitting of more than one interpretation; duplexity in meaning."
Undaunted, we refer to "ambiguous," and discover that it indicates that which is "capable of being understood in either of
two or more possible senses; equivocal." Light begins to dawn.
*Professor of Law, University of Nebraska.
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A word is ambiguous if it has two or more possible meanings.
But what is meaning? Immediately gloom descends once more.
To formulate an adequate conception of "meaning" for the purposes of statutory interpretation is a task of surprising difficulty.
"Words," say Ogden and Richards, "as everyone now knows,
'mean' nothing by themselves... ."' But this general knowledge
2
seems not to have permeated some tribunals of last resort.
If words "mean" nothing by themselves, it seems the sheerest nonsense to assert that words are either ambiguous or unambiguous. Students of semantics seem to agree, though perhaps
not all would adopt the same terminology, that a word has
"meaning" when it symbolizes a referent.3
Words such a
"fascism" or "democracy" have no "meaning" because they do
not stand for any referent. The word "apple" may have "meaning" if it stands for a particular object, the existence of which
may be verified. Complex symbols such as "contract," "ownership" and "title" may have "meaning" since they stand for a
group of referents, each of which must be present. 4 It might be
'The Meaning of Meaning (3d ed. 1930) 9. The authoritative character
of this work, which has been used extensively in the preparation of the
following article, may have been overemphasized, due to the present writer's
inexperience in the field of semantics. It is intended, however, merely to
cite it as representing an interesting and reasonable point of view, and to
as they relate to statutory interpretation.
follow
2 some of its implications
1t is believed, for example, that much of the difficulty underlying the
application of the contracts clause tc legislation enacted under the "police
power" is due to the assumption cn the part of some courts that the
word "contract" has a settled "meaning" which can easily be ascertained
and applied. Cf. the following: "I necessarily conclude that the prohibition
against the impairment of contracts by the legislature is so clear that it
is only by an unwarranted judicial distortion of its plain provisions that
the moratory law could be upheld. The meaning of the constitutional provision is so clear that it is not subject to construction. The idea that an
existing emergency could change its meaning is clearly disproved by a
reading of the simple language contained in the provision itself ...
Carter, J., specially concurring in First Trust Company v. Smith, (1938)
134 Neb. 84, 129, 277 N. W. 762, 784. But if the word "contract" may
"mean," among other things, an agreement entered into between parties in
the light of existing laws, including the power of the legislature to act
in furtherance of the general welfare, the invalidity of moratory legislation becomes less obvious. As to the "meaning" of the expression "freedom of contract," compare Adkins v. Children's Hospital, (1923) 261 U. S.
525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785, and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
(1937) 300 U. S.379, 57 Sup. Ct. 587, 81 L. Ed. 703.
3
Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning (3d ed. 1930), especially chapter V. "Referent" as here used, "means" the thing or things for
which the word or symbol stands. See, passim, Stuart Chase, The Tyranny
of Words (1938) and Goldberg, The Wonder of Words (1938) especially
chapter XV. Cf. the use of "determinate" and "determinable" in Radin,
Statutory Interpretation, (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863.
4
These terms, of course, constitute a convenient type of shorthand
which relieves lawyers from the necessity of indicating all of the elements
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said that a word is ambiguous if it stands for more than one
referent. But this is against the rules. Quoting again from
Ogden and Richards, "One symbol stands for one and only one
referent."5 If a word is not a symbol it has no "meaning." If
it is a symbol, it cannot be ambiguous. Therefore words either
"mean" nothing or have but one "meaning." But Webster says
that an ambiguous word is one which is "capable of being understood in either of two or more possible senses." This may indicate that if it is possible for hearers to find more than one referent
for a word it is ambiguous. It is possible, though perhaps not
reasonable, for hearers to make more than one reference when
any word is pronounced. Thus, when the word "apple" is heard
the reference "orange" or "tomato" may be made and so on, ad
infinitum. Or, if the word "dog" is pronounced, reference to
either "Rover" or "Spot" is possible. If this position is taken,
all words become ambiguous. This tends to become discouraging, and induces a type of verbal paralysis which is common to
amateurs in the field of semantics.
Experts on statutory interpretation, however, have never
studied semantics. This is perhaps a good thing.' At any rate,
certain basic assumptions seem to underly the interpretive process. One of these appears to be that "intention" has something to do with interpretation. In the case of private integrations" it is usually said that words are to be interpreted in accordance with the "intention" of the parties.7 When statutes are
which they include whenever it becomes desirable to describe the situation
which they connote. When the word "contract" occurs, for example, lawyers will understand, subject to certain qualifications of the type mentioned in note 2, supra, that it includes the elements of legally competent
parties, apparent mutual assent, consideration (where necessary), and lawful purpose. Each of these elements may be reduced further. The fact
that the word is highly complex does not destroy its validity, but it becomes dangerous to use in situations where extreme precision is required.
Cf. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, (1913) 23 Yale L. J. 16.
rOgden and Richards, The M1eaning of Meaning (3d ed. 1930) 88.
GThe term "integration" is here used as it is employed in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts of the American Law Institute (1932). "An
agreement is integrated where the parties thereto adopt a writing or writings as the final and complete expression of the agreement. An integration
is the writing or writings so adopted." Sec. 228. In general the Restatement has been cited hereinafter in support of broad propositions which do
not require
detailed examination.
7
The following statement is typical: "Generally speaking, the cardinal
rule in the interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the intention of the
parties and to give effect to that intention if it can be done consistently
with legal principles." 12 Am. Jur., Contracts, sec. 227. Compare the
much more accurate statement in the Restatement of the Law of Contracts,
sec. 230: "The standard of interpretation of an integration, except where
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involved, the "intention" of the legislature is said to control!
This may indicate that the words of a contract or statute will be
held by the courts to be symbols of the referents the parties or
the legislature had in mind. This assumes first that the parties
and the legislature did have referents in mind; second, that all
the parties and all the members of the legislature had the same
referents in mind; and third, that it is possible to discover what
the referents are. In the case o f integrations by private parties,
it seems obvious that this idea isnot to be taken seriously. Not
the "subjective intent," but the "objective manifestations of
intent" are considered by the courts. 10 Thus, the fact that an
integration is ambiguous in the sense that the parties actually had
different referents in mind, or "meaningless" in the sense that
the words used did not symbolize referents, becomes irrelevant
in many cases. The court will select its owf referents, and hold
that the words are symbols of those referents. In other word&
the court will declare that an integration "means" what it (the
court) thinks it "means."'1 : This will ordinarily be explained
by the statement that the parties have made an objective manifestation of their intention in clear and unmistakable terms, and
it produces an ambiguous result, or is excluded by a rule of law establishing a definite meaning, is the meaning that would be attached to the integration by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with all operative
usages and knowing all the circumstances prior to and contemporaneous
with the making of the integration, other than oral statements by the parties of what they intended it to mean." See also sees. 231, 233.
SAgain, a typical formulation is given instead of a cumulative citation
of authorities: "In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the
primary rule is to give effect to the intention of the legislature." 25
R. C. L., Statutes, sec. 216.
9
Compare: "A symbol refers to what it is actually used to refer to;
not necessarily to what it ought, in good usage, or is intended by an interpreter, or is intended by the user to refer to." Ogden and Richards, The
Meaning of Meaning (3d ed. 1930) 103.
1o"It is customarily said that mutual assent is essential to the formation of informal contracts, but is should further be stated that the mutual
asssent must be manifested by one party to the other, and except as so
manifested is unimportant. In some branches of the law, especially in the
criminal law, a person's secret intent is important, but in the formation of
contracts it was long ago settled that secret intent was immaterial, only
overt acts being considered in the determination of such mutual assent
as that branch of the law requires." Williston and Thompson, Contracts
(rev. ed. 1936) see. 22. See Restatement of the Law of Contracts, sec. 20.
"Perhaps this is not an entirely fair way of putting it. It is not
intended to convey the suggestion that courts are often capricious or unreasonable. The "meaning" given an integration by the courts will
usually coincide with that which would be given it by any other unbiased
observer.
since the courts actually make the decisions, it is their
"meaning" But
which is really adopted rather than that of a hypothetical reasonable man.
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that they cannot vary those terms by the introduction of parol
evidence to show their actual intention. 2
However, on occasion, the court will not be satisfied as to
what the referent is. In this case, the integration will be called
"ambiguous" and an attempt will be made to determine the referent
understood by the parties. Here, moral considerations seem to
enter into the picture. If each party is innocent with respect
to the existence of the "ambiguity," the words used will be
held to symbolize the referent which each party had in mind.
If it happens that the court is satisfied that each party had the
same referent in mind, it will say that a "contract" is present;
otherwise there will be no contract. On the other hand, if one
of the parties was at fault with respect to the occurrence of the
"ambiguity," then the referent the other party had in mind is
selected as being the true one, and it will be said that there is a
"contract" on the basis of the "meaning" attached by the innocent
party. 13 Therefore it appears that, dependent on such circumstances as have been indicated, a "contract" may "mean" what
both parties think it "means," what neither party thinks it
"means" or what one of the parties thinks it "means."
Much the same sort of thing is to be found if statutes rather
than private integrations are considered. Finding the "intention"
of the legislature is said to be the goal of interpretation. One is
met here by a difficulty in limine. Is there such a thing as
legislative intention? The views expressed by professors are,
as usual, diverse. 14 But the courts seem unaware of the problem.
Assuming the existence of legislative intention, they have proceeded to declare what it is. When they feel satisfied without
further investigation that they know what the statute "means."
it is plain and unambiguous, leaving no room for interpretation.
When the "meaning" is felt to be obscure, various extrinsic aids
are employed in discovering it. One of the principal difficulties
for the innocent bystander is to decide when a statute is suffi"-'Of course this does not take into account the possibility of reforming an integration in such a way as to make actual intent effective.
Restatement of Contracts, sec. 238 (c).

See

13Restatment of Contracts, sec. 233.
" The positions taken may be summarized as follows: There is no
such thing as legislative intention. Radin, Statutory Interpretation, (1930)
43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 870. Legislative intention exists and may frequently be established. Landis, A Note on Statutory Interpretation, (1930)
43 Harv. L. Rev. 886, 888. Whether or not legislative intention exists, it
is useful to act as if it did. F. E. Horack, Jr., In the Name of Legislative

Intention, (1932) 38 W. Va. L. Q. 119, 126.
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ciently "ambiguous" to permit the use of extrinsic aids to determine the true "meaning."
Tentatively, it would seem that the following things might be
true regarding the "meaning" of a statute. Each member of the
legislature might have precisely the same referents in mind, and
it might be possible to discover what those referents are. This
is extremely unlikely. The members of the legislative committee
having charge of the statute may have had certain referents in
mind, which may be shown by the committee reports or the
statements of the member representing the committee on the
floor. This sometimes happens, though the courts do not always
pay much attention to the circumstance.'
No member of the
legislature may have bad the referent in mind which it is sought
to establish in a particular case. Perhaps this is the most common situation. No member of the legislature may have had anything in mind when the statute was passed. There are no
statistics on this proposition.
All of these situations may conceivably come before the courts
in the course of litigation. As a practical matter, it is believed
that only the second and third are of any considerable importance. Courts decide these cases on the ostensible basis that
the legislative intention is being discovered and applied. This
must "mean" that a statute "means" what the legislature thinks
it "means," i. e., that words used in a statute are symbols of the
referents which the legislature had in mind when the statute was
passed. All statutory interpretation therefore appears to disregard the fourth canon of symbolism suggested by Ogden and
Richards, in that the state of mind of the users of the words is
ostensibly the controlling factor. 16 It remains to be discovered
to what extent the rule as stated can and should be applied.
To what extent is legislative intention relevant in statutory
interpretation? It is suggested that evidence of the intention of
legislative committees should be regarded as evidence of legislative intention for this purpose"- and further, that legislative
'5An outstanding example of the refusal of a court to follow the legis-

lative intention as revealed by the legislative history of the measure is the
decision applying the provisions of the Mann Act to an isolated and noncommercial transportation of women for immoral purposes. Caminetti v.
United States, (1916) 242 U. S. 470, 37 Sup. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442. Cf.
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, (1893) 143 U. S. 457, 12
Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed. 226.
'6 The Canon is set out in note 9, supra.
"7It is not unreasonable to suppose that individual legislators who hear
the explanation of a statute given by the person having charge of the bill
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intention may be established by reference to former statutes,
amendments and legislative procedure. 18 If the courts really
act on the assumption that the intention of the legislature is controlling, then resort should be made in every case to every device
by which intention may be shown. This would indicate that
every statute is ambiguous as the term is used by the courts. 19
Just as an individual using words in a contract may, as a matter of
subjective intention, have quite a different referent in mind when
a word is used than would be ordinarily supposed by the other
party, so the legislature may. through mistake or ignorance, select
words which, in the mind of the reader. may cause quite a different
reference than that which was contemplated. No matter how
absurd the result might be. the court should, according to the
rule stated, find the referent which the legislature had in mind.
Thus, if an act were passed providing that all red-headed men
should be subject to a poll tax of five dollars, and it were to
appear by means of extrinsic evidence that the legislature really
"meant" the statute to apply to all bald men, the court should
adopt a construction which would carry out that intention.
Is such a statute "ambiguous" or "unambiguous"? If, as
has been suggested, the statute "means" what the legislature
thinks it "means," then it is a statute couched in unambiguous
terms, applying to all bald men. If the test is whether two or
more referents might be found for it. then it is ambiguous. The
reader of the statute would find the referent. "all red-headed
men," while the legislature, by hypothesis. did in fact find the
referent "all bald men." But if the case were actually litigated,
it is a safe assumption that the court would find the statute to
be unambiguous and to apply to red-headed men. This would
seem to indicate the futility of trying to solve problems of interpretation by creating the artificial categories of "ambiguous" and
"unambiguous" statutes.
Probably no one would question the correctness of the decision
in the supposed case. It would be intolerable to permit the legison the floor and who thereafter vote in favor of the passage of the
measure acquiesce in the statement made. See Landis, A Note on Statutory Interpretation, (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 886.
'sLandis, A Note on Statutory Interpretation, (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev.
886.
10"Interpretation is but comparison and judgment and both of these
processes take place before the court can determine the existence of ambiguity. Nothing is ambiguous in the abstract; or else, everything in the
abstract is ambiguous." Horack, In the Name of Legislative Intention,
(1932) 38 W. Va. L. Q. 119, 121.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

lative intention to control. We are forced to the conclusion,
therefore, that in some cases, legislative intention, even where it
can be established, is irrelevant. This seems to destroy the very
foundation of statutory interpretation as it has been expounded
in the cases. However, this result has its counterpart in situations involving private integra:ions. It is suggested that the
parol evidence rule as applied to private integrations, and the
so-called rule that where a statute is plain and unambiguous there
is no room for construction, are different aspects of the same
thing. What the basis of this notion is must now, if possible, be
discovered.
While students of semantics may explore the problem of
"meaning" at their leisure, courts must decide cases. When a
writing, whether contract or statute, is the basis of litigation,
the court must discover a "meaning" or else leave the parties
without any authoritative determination of their rights. It is
probably true that at least the simpler words are generally understood to have fixed and determinable referents.20 Were this not
so, communication between human beings except by gestures
would be impossible. Perhaps it is not indulging in too wild an
assumption to state that courts are reasonably conversant with
the "meanings" of words in popular usage, and will interpret
words in such a way as to follow usage. If private parties wish
to adopt "meanings" for words which differ from those usually
understood, they may doubtless do so for their own purposes, but
it is dearly unreasonable for them to expect the machinery of
justice to be set in motion in order to follow their own caprice.
If contracts are to be interpreted by courts, the parties must use
the language of the court, and of other people in general, rather
than a private code. 2' The same thing is true with respect to
the use of words by legislative bodies. Further, it should be
remembered that statutes are written and published so that individuals may govern their conduct in accordance with the legislative command. In such circumstances it is not unreasonable to
insist that the burden of communication is on the legislature, and
20
For example, if a housewife asks her grocer for a dozen oranges,
it is extremely unlikely that even the most eccentric purveyor of foods
would present her with a sack containing twelve onions. On the other
hand, if her request is for citrus fruit, she should probably not be heard to
complain if she receives lemons.
210f course parties should be permitted to express themselves in accordance with recognized usage, and to make use of technical and trade
terms subject to generally recognized qualifications. Restatement of Contracts, sees. 246-249.
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that if words having a usually accepted "meaning" are used, that
"meaning" should be applied no matter what the legislature may
have intended.
The idea expressed by the statement that when a statute is
plain and unambiguous there is no room for construction and
by the parol evidence rule seems to be, then, that when words
are used which are generally understood to have certain "meanings" the court will not consider any extrinsic evidence pointing to an intention to adopt another "meaning." It may be true
that when such language is used the intended "meaning" will
usually coincide with the understood "meaning," so that there is
some justification for the expression frequently found in opinions
that the legislature (or the parties) are "presumed" to intend the
latter.2 - But the significant thing is that it makes no difference
whether such is the case or not. In this situation intention is
irrelevant. It would not be followed even if established.
There are, of course, many situations in which legislative
intention, as the term is here used, may be discovered and applied.
These seem to be cases in which the court feels that any one of a
number of "meanings" may reasonably be adopted. Since the
court has no strong convictions on the subject, it is willing to
discover, if possible, what the legislature had in mind.2 3 Is a
tomato a "fruit" or a "vegetable?" 24 Is a jig-saw puzzle a
"game?"
Is a street railway crossing state lines a "common
carrier by railroad ?"'2 In instances of this sort, the statutes are
2-See the cases listed in 25 R. C. L. Statutes, sec. 234, note 16.
-This is subject to the qualification that the statute must be clear
enough to enable the court to attach some "meaning" to it. This is especially true in the case of criminal statutes, where the requirements of
definiteness and certainty have been the subject of much litigation. See,
e.g., Jennings v. State, (1861) 16 Ind. 335; see, passim, Aigler, Legislation in Vague Terms, (1923) 21 Mich. L. Rev. 831. Cf. F. B. Washburn
& Co. v., United States, (C.C.A. 1st Cir. 1915) 224 Fed. 395 (What is a
macaroon?)
2
'Nix v. Hedden, (1887) 149 U. S. 304, 307, 13 Sup. Ct. 881, 37 L.
Ed. 745.
25White v. Aronson, (1937) 302 U. S.16, 58 Sup. Ct. 95, 82 L. Ed. 20.
2Omaha etc. Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, (1913) 230 U. S.
324, 33 Sup. Ct. 890, 57 L. Ed. 1501. In Nix v. Hedden, (1887) 149
U. S.304, 13 Sup. Ct. 881, 37 L. Ed. 745, the inquiry was directed to the
"meaning" of the words "fruit," "tomato" and "vegetable," while in the
Omaha Railway Case, the question really seems to have been whether the
road in question was the sort of common carrier which congress intended
to include under the terms of the Interstate Commerce Act. It has been
suggested that a distinction may be drawn between determining the "meaning" of a word "as a word" and determining the application of a word
of "known meaning" to different sets of facts. Endlich, Interpretation of
Statutes (1888) sec. 9. This seems to be equivalent to saying that words
"mean" something by themselves. It is suggested that such a distinction
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apt to be termed "ambiguous" as a prelude to investigating the
state of mind of the legislature. The word "ambiguous" in this
connection appears to "mean" that the court is not satisfied with
the "meaning" of the statute and wishes to look further before it
decides the case. This seems to be the only situation in which
legislative intention actually has an ascertainable effect in statutory interpretation. Even here, however, courts at times refuse
to give effect to legislative intention revealed by extrinsic evidence, -preferring to rely on rules for the interpretation of written instruments as an aid to discovering the supposed intention
from the words of the statute."
There remains the vast area in which courts are called upon
to decide cases involving statutes, as to which there is no discoverable evidence of legislative intention other than that disclosed by
the words of the enactment. Especially in regard to state laws
this is the rule rather than the exception. Here, courts are
prone to state that the case is decided on the basis of what the
legislature must have intended. The legislature is "presumed"
to be reasonable.28 The legislature is "presumed" not to intend
a harsh and inequitable result.29 Again, the statute which is
is productive of confusion and should not be followed. The real issue in
cases in which the court is satisfied with the "meaning" of the words
used by the legislature is whether it is good policy to apply the statute
in a given situation. Whether or not the legislature intended the statute
to apply may be relevant in arriving at a decision, but it is confusing to
assert that the court is finding "meaning" or is interpreting the act in such
a case.
27"I think it right to say that we have none of us acted on, or taken
into consideration in the least, the speeches made in parliament. In fact,
I think my brothers, who were not parties to the rule being granted, never
heard of them at all; and they certainly have not read them. I express no
opinion as. to whether in a proper case a statement of facts might be
moved from speeches in Parliament, but we have not paid the slightest
attention to any of the speeches which were referred to in the affidavits
on which the rules were removed." Lord Alverstone, C. J., in The King
v. Board of Education, [19091 2 K. B. 1045, 1072. This seems to represent the view taken by British courts. In the United States, certain types
of extrinsic evidence usually are considered, but statements in debates made
by private members are not referred to. However, committee reports, legislative history, statutes previously enacted relating to the same subject and
other acts in pari materia are considered and, apparently, relied upon to
a considerable extent. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
(1921) 254 U. S. 443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L. Ed. 349; Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, (1893) 143 U. S. 457, 12 Sup. Ct. 511, 36 L. Ed.
226; State v. Larimore, 4 W. W. Harr. (Del.) 153, 144 Atl. 867; United
States
2 v. Katz, (1926) 271 U. S. 354, 46 Sup. Ct. 513, 70 L. Ed. 986.
8E.g., United States v. Hartwell, (1868) 6 Wall. (U.S.) 385, 396,
18 L. Ed. 830; State v. Williams, (1910) 173 Ind. 414, 90 N. E. 754;
Meroney
v. Atlanta Bldg. etc., Ass'n, (1895) 116 N. C. 882, 21 S. E. 924.
29
E.g., Adams v. Woods, (1804) 2 Cranch (U.S.) 336, 341, 2 L. Ed.
297; In re Meyer, (1913) 209 N. Y. 386, 103 N. E. 713.
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plain and unambiguous on its face is said to leave no room for
construction. And again it may be remarked that this constitutes
an indication that the real intention of the legislature is considered
irrelevant.
Finally there are the cases in which the court extends the
provisions of a statute to cases which do not appear to be included
in its terms, or refuses to apply a statute apparently applicable
in a given situation. Much discussion has centered around the
doctrine of the "equity of the statute," and its origins and scope
have been thoroughly considered."' It is not proposed to continue the debate along these lines. However two points are pertinent to the present inquiry. In the first place, when a court
gives an "equitable" interpretation to a statute it usually is giving
it a "meaning" which is not apparent from its terms. In other
words, to use the orthodox language, it is taking a statute which
is "plain and unambiguous on its face" and concerning which
there is therefore "no room for construction," and either applying
it to a case not apparently covered by its terms 31 or refusing to
apply it to a case in which it is apparently applicable. 32 Thus,
"unambiguous" statutes are, in some situations, treated as if they
were "ambiguous." This is a further illustration of the futility
of using these terms as if they furnished a real basis for decision.
The second observation as to these cases is that once again
legislative intention in the sense of real advertence to the particular situation involved is probably irrelevant. It would be conceded that in most instances of this kind the particular problem
involved did not occur to the legislature. At any rate, evidence
of legislative intention is generally lacking. Most courts resorting to the equity of the statute, either consciously or unconsciously, will make use of language tending to indicate that
deference is being paid to the intention of the legislature. Since
there is no real indication of what the legislature thought, it is
necessary to accomplish this by the use of presumptions. "We
will not presume that the legislature intended such a harsh and
inequitable result." "The legislature could not have intended
30Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon's Case, (1936) 31 Ill.
L. Rev. 202; Lloyd, The Equity of a Statute, (1909) 58 U. Pa. L. Rev.

76; De Sloovere, The Equity and Reason of a Statute, (1936) 21 Corn.
L. Quart. 591; Pound, Spurious Interpretation, (1907) 7 Col. L. Rev. 379;
Gray,31Nature and Sources of the Law (2d ed. 1921) 179 ff.
E.g., Turbett Twp. v. Port Royal Borough, (1907) 33 Pa. Super. Ct.
520. 32See Encarnacion v. Jamison, (1929) 251 N. Y. 218, 167 N. E. 422.
E.g., Riggs v. Palmer, (1889) 115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188; United
States v. Kirby, (1867) 7 Wall. (U.S.) 482, 19 L. Ed. 278.
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the statute to apply in such a case as this one." As Professor
Horack has indicated,3 3 this constitutes speculation about what
the legislature would have thot.ght had it thought. An opinion
which was sufficiently frank as to the analysis used in such a
case might read as follows: "We are confronted with a case
which must be decided. There is no evidence as to what the
legislature thought about it. We feel. that it would be unfair
(unjust; inequitable) to make the statute cover this case. We
believe that members of the legislature would have the same
opinion. Therefore we hold that the statute is inapplicable."
It is suggested that the fourth sentence in the above statement
involves a purely gratuitous assumption which might as well be
eliminated as far as its bearing on the actual result is concerned.
If the legislative intention can never be established either because there is no evidence of it or because there was none, it
seems futile to pretend that it is actually being considered in the
solution of the case. The court is actually giving the statute its
own "meaning," and reference to the legislature is unnecessary
except to preserve an illusion. Whether this technique is legitimate is beside the point as far as the present inquiry is concerned."'
It is a mistake to treat statutory interpretation as if it were
completely distinct from the general field of the interpretation of
writings. Almost every "rule" for determining the "meaning"
of statutes has its counterpart in interpreting private integrations. 35 One gets the impression from studying the general problem of interpretation that legislative intention is felt to be entitled to greater respect than that of private parties, and that
what would be referred to as "subjective intention" in contract
law should, in the case of statutes, be given greater effect. This
is perhaps due to the position which the legislature occupies as
a branch of the government coordinate with the judiciary. But
it is submitted that the result should not follow. The wide33Horack, In the Name of Legislative Intention, (1932) 38 W. Va.
L. J. 119, 127.
34
There would seem to be these alternatives: either the court must,
in cases such as those mentioned above, give a statute its own "meaning,"
which will usually be influenced by what the court believes the legislature
would have intended, and thus make the law effective, or it must declare

that it is unable to find the "meaning" and refuse to give the statute any

effect. It is submitted that the first alternative is preferable, except where
no "reasonable meaning" can be attached to the statute. See infra, p. 521.

35This will be readily apparent to anyone who will scan the headings
devoted to each subject in any oi the standard legal encyclopedias or
digests.
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spread effect of statutes and their function as a guide to the
future conduct of great numbers of persons should, it is believed,
place a definite "burden of communication" on the legislature.
One can have the greatest respect for the legislature as a coordinate branch of the government, and still insist on its duty to
express itself in relatively intelligible language.
If carried to its logical conclusion, the view here expressed
might result in a refusal on the part of courts to give any effect
to a statute the "meaning" of which could not be discovered without resort to extrinsic evidence. It is believed, however, that
this would place too heavy a burden on the legislature. Anyone
who has had experience in the drafting of instruments, whether
statutes or contracts, knows the impossibility of creating phrases
which are free from doubt. Especially is this true in the statutory field where it is necessary to attempt to guard not only
against ordinary perils but also against wilful misconstruction.
If a statute may reasonably be understood to have more than
one "meaning" it would seem to be constitutionally enforceable
to be sufficiently informative, and the legislative intention, if ascertainable, should be controlling as to the precise "meaning."
In the light of the foregoing discussion the following suggestions may be made: The terms "ambiguous" and "unambiguous" as used in cases on statutory interpretation should be
discarded as confusing and "meaningless." It should always be
permissible for courts to discover the legislative intention if possible. However, once it has been discovered, it should be relevant to the solution of the case"only if consistent with the "meaning" which may reasonably be attached to the words used. In
other cases the "meaning" of the court is decisive. This will
generally accord with the "meaning" which would be attached to
the words by ordinary persons, but in some cases a different result may be reached because of considerations of equity or policy
which, in the minds of the courts, are controlling.

